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In current loose parlance, the view that mathematical objects exist is regarded as
Platonism. It might therefore seem obvious that this existence was the basic
assumption of ancient mathematics – not least if we accept Proclos’s statement in
his commentary to Elements I [ed. Friedlein 1873: 6820f, trans. Morrow 1970: 57] that
Euclid “belonged to the persuasion of Plato and was at home in his philosophy”.1
Actually, the ancient texts do not speak exactly in terms that can unambiguously
be translated into “existence” (presupposing for the sake of the argument that this
latter term possesses an unambiguous meaning) – at best they use forms and
derivatives of the verb ειµι, “to be”, which (as pointed out in the ancient texts
themselves) has a wide, and wider, range of meanings, though certainly including
“being there”. In order to decide the stance of the ancients with regard to the
question of mathematical existence, we must therefore attempt a translation, not de
verbo ad verbum but “conceptual network to conceptual network”. We shall have to
ask whether, and in which sense, something mathematical was supposed to exist
by ancient Greek mathematicians and/or Greek philosophers discussing mathematics.
The point of asking this question in a context which is not primarily concerned with
ancient thought is that the outcome may elucidate not only ambiguities that inhere
in the writings of the ancients but also ambivalences in more recent debates. I shall,
however, abstain from drawing such wider conclusions myself on the present
occasion.
In contemporary discussions, mathematical “existence” is often meant as a
negation of unconstrained constructibility – what exists can be discovered but cannot
be invented. If this perspective is combined with the view that mathematics is first
of all concerned with coherent structures, the question to the ancients might be
whether they considered mathematics in toto (or at least whole mathematical
domains) as somehow existing or constrained by reality (and in case, by which
reality). This is a problem to which we shall return; however, the explicit discussions
in ancient writings which come closest to the question of existence are concerned
not with mathematics as such or with domains but with the objects of mathematics,
τα µαθηµατικα, “the mathematicals” – numbers, ratios, lines, triangles, etc.
1 I use three kinds of translations in the following: (i) some are borrowed from an existing
translation, in which cases the translator is identified as here; (ii) others are similarly borrowed
but corrected at points where I find the translation unduly free for my purpose or inconsistent
with the remaining text – for these, the translator is identified in the same way, but corrected
passages are put into superscript pointed brackets 〈 〉 (inserted explanations and words from
the original text evidently appear in [ ]); (iii) some shorter phrases I have finally translated
myself (but obviously controlled against established translations); quotations with no identified
translator belong to this category.
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Aristotle
The surviving writings of the ancient mathematicians are not explicit on this
account. This does not preclude a reading searching for hidden presuppositions,
but such a reading is most likely to yield a result if seen in the light of the more
outspoken discussions of the philosophers. I shall refrain, however, from a broad
coverage of this topic and concentrate on the writings of the philosopher, that is,
Aristotle.
The central Aristotelian concept in any discussion of what is really there is ουσια,
“being” or, in the received translation, “substance”.2 Actually, speaking of a
“concept” may be a slight overstatement. Aristotle himself points out in De anima
in consequence, even substance) constitutes a hierarchy, no single level: “utmost
matter” (υλη εσχατ[η]), as substrate receiving the qualities of warmth, cold, humid
and dry (“utmost form”), gives rise to the four elements, which seen in this
perspective are substances; these, on their part, also function as matter which, united
in proper proportion (λογος – another level of form4) produce bone, flesh etc., a
higher level of substance. But even flesh etc., growing naturally together (συµφυσει)
are matter for a still higher level of substance, namely the head and other bodily
parts. These then constitute the matter for a “substance in the strictest sense”, the
living person (Socrates or Callias).
Elsewhere we find the term “material substance” (ουσια υλικη) in what seems
to be the sense of “non-utmost matter”.5 This agrees without much difficulty with
the passage that was just discussed. Not directly in harmony with this, nor however
in blunt contradiction, is the usage of the Categories (trans. Cook in [Cook &
Tredennick 1938]), according to which species and genera are “secondary substances”
(δευτεραι ουσιαι), the individuals being “primary” (πρωται ουσιαι) – individuals
being “best spoken of” as substances, and among the universals species more
properly than genera (2b7–8,15–18). In contrast, Metaphysics Ζ, 1038b9ff argues (echoed
by Ι, 1053b17) that the universal (το καθολου) cannot be a substance. For this reason
(1039a24ff), even Ideas cannot be (separable) substances, at least if species are
constituted from a genus (functioning as substrate) and determined by the imposition
of differentiae – but this whole discussion of the status of universals and forms is
spurred by the preceding observation (1029a27ff) that matter is even less a substance –
characterized, as stated here (and again in Λ, 1070b36–1071a1), by separability and
individuality – than both the form and the combination of form and matter.
All passages discussed so far regard sensible and movable “primary” substances
and the matter and form that cause them to exist. In this domain, as we see, the term
is supposed to cover primarily individual entities, and matter (at whatever level),
form and universals only deserve it in restricted or secondary ways. Substances of
this kind may be characterized mathematically (the oft-mentioned bronze sphere
is an obvious instance – Metaphysics 1070a3–4), but the mathematical characterization
in itself is never discussed as a sensible substance. In Metaphysics Η 1043b34 it is said
explicitly that if really numbers are substances, then at least not as claimed by “some”
(probably Pythagoreans) as aggregates of (possibly sensible) monads. Below we shall
meet a reference to “sensible circles” which are told not to be those of mathematics.
Another category of substance can neither be perceived by the senses nor
4 This specification is borrowed from the kindred passage in De anima I, 410a2 – cf. also
Metaphysics Ν, 1092b18–22.
5 Metaphysics Η, 1044a15; Θ, 1049a36; and Μ, 1077a36.
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moved – it is immovable and “intelligible” (νοητος), it can only be reached through
the intellect, the νους. In Metaphysics Λ, 1069a34–36 we are told that this separate
category is postulated by some, either comprising both Forms and mathematicals
(either as distinct subcategories or as one indistinct class) or consisting of
mathematicals alone. Later in bookΛ, however, only the Prime Mover (and, possibly,
the movers of the celestial spheres) are counted as intelligible substances – Aristotle
evidently does not share the views presented a bit earlier. Book Ζ, 1028b20–27 [trans.
Tredennick 1933: I, 315] is more explicit:
Thus Plato posited the Forms and the 〈mathematicals〉 as two kinds of substance, and
as a third the substance of sensible bodies; and Speusippos assumed still more kinds
of substances, starting with “the One,” and positing principles for each kind: one for
numbers, another for magnitudes, and then another for the soul. In this way he multiplies
the kind of substance. Some [the followers of Xenocrates, successor to Speusippos as
head of the Academy] again hold that the Forms and numbers have the same nature,
and that other things – lines and planes – are dependent upon them; and so on back
to the substance of 〈the heaven〉 and sensible things.
Even to Aristotle, however, the mathematicals are, or are sometimes, intelligible.
In Metaphysics Ζ, 1035b33–1036a12 [trans. Tredennick 1933: I, 361–363] we find the
following reflections:6
A part, then, may be part of the form (by form I mean essence), or of the concrete whole
composed of form and matter, or of the matter itself. But only the parts of the form are
parts of the formula, and the formula refers to the universal; for “circle” is the same as
“essence of circle”, and “soul” the same as “essence of soul”. But when we come to the
concrete thing, e.g. this circle – which is a particular individual, either sensible or
intelligible (by intelligible circles I means those of mathematics, and by “sensible” those
which are of bronze or wood) – of these individuals there is no definition; we apprehend
them by intelligence [µετα νοησεως] or perception and when they have passed from
the sphere of actuality [εκ της εντελεχειας] it is uncertain whether they exist [εισιν] or
not, but they are always spoken of and apprehended by the universal formula. But the
matter is in itself unknowable [αγνωστος]. Some matter is sensible and some intelligible;
sensible, such as bronze and wood and all movable matter; intelligible, that which is
present in sensible things not qua sensible, 〈such as〉 the 〈mathematicals〉.
Mathematical circles are thus two different things: the word may refer to the
universal defined by a formula or λογος, for instance the one which is quoted in
Plato’s (or ps-Plato’s) Seventh Letter [trans. Bury 1929: 533], “that which is everywhere
equidistant from the extremities to the centre” or it may designate a particular
specimen, distinct (it seems) from the actual drawing but still coming into actual
existence and passing away from it (together with the drawing, we must presume);
6 “Essence” corresponds everywhere in the quotation to το τι ην ειναι, cf. note 2; “formula”
corresponds to λογος, cf. p. 3.
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we may think of one of the two distinct circles that serve in the construction of
Elements I.1.7 The final passage “But the matter ... mathematicals” could be taken
to refer to the problem that the existence of distinct individuals belonging to the
same species presupposes that they originate by the imposition of form upon matter;
in this reading, Aristotle concludes that the matter (υλη) of the distinct circles is
unknowable (αγνωστος) but intelligible.8 Alternatively, the mathematicals themselves
are regarded as matter, which is “present in” (υπαρχουσα) sensible objects (the term
for presence having strong connotations of “belonging properly to” and of
subordination, which indeed fits matter better than form). The latter reading is
strongly supported by the parallel “such as bronze ... such as the mathematicals”
(οιον χαλκος ... οιον τα µαθηµατικα) and by the choice of grammatical case.9 It is
7 Such particular specimens are of course localizable, and to assume that Aristotle should
refer to them might seem to contradict the assertion made in Ν, 1092a19–20 – viz that
mathematicals (including in particular mathematical solids) have no position; but the context
(a discussion of generating principles) shows that here the category of mathematicals which
coincide with their essence is meant.
8 This is how the passage is interpreted by Ian Mueller [1970: 163]. Further on (pp. 166f),
Mueller mentions (accepting the view) that an ancient commentary ascribed to Alexander
of Aphrodisias understands the matter in question be mere extension – cf. also [Heath 1949:
224]. Since Physics IV, 209a21 says explicitly that place (τοπος) is not the matter of anything,
the idea is not without problems – in particular because it has just been explained (208b27–28)
that the vacuum which certain thinkers accept is “place deprived of bodies”, which shows
us that Aristotle’s “place” encompasses what we would call “space”. To this comes, as pointed
out by Thomas Anderson [1969: 22 n. 59], the difficulty that numbers can hardly be supposed
to have extension as their matter (instead, as we shall see in note 23, the observation that
numbers and geometrical shapes are always numbers and shapes of something, leads him
to suggest that the intelligible matter may be indeterminate, unspecified substance).
To modern ears it may sound strange that something is intelligible but unknowable, but
the two terms belong at different levels. The former epithet refers to an ontological
dichotomy – indeed, “sensible matter” cannot be reached by the senses. The latter refers to
the shared characteristic of everything not submitted to measure and order (thus not least
utmost matter); its use can be elucidated by a passage from the Rhetoric (1408b21–28, trans.
[Freese 1926: 383]) about the form of prose composition: it should not be metrical, nor however
without rhythm, “for that which is unlimited (απειρον) is unpleasant and unknowable. Now
all things are limited by number, and the number belonging to the form of diction is rhythm,
of which the metres are the divisions”.
9 At least three other passages from the Metaphysics refer to mathematicals as matter, in one
obliquely, in the others explicitly but in different senses. The first is Μ, 1078a29–31, where
we find that the geometricians are right in claiming that what they discuss is something real
(οντα); being (το ον), indeed, is of two kinds – either entelechy, “full actuality” (which the
mathematicals have just been argued not to be) or material (υλικως). The second is Ν,
1092b17–18, where it is said in connection with a discussion of the composition of flesh and
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also confirmed by the context – the passage sums up a preceding discussion in which
it is stated among other things [trans. Tredennick 1933: I, 355–359] that
[1035a9] This is why the formula of the circle does not contain that of the segments,
whereas the formula of the syllable does contain that of the letters; for the letters are
parts of the formula of the form [of the syllable]; they are not matter; but the segments
are parts in the sense of matter in which the form is induced. [... 1035a17] For even if
the line is divided and resolved into its halves, or if the man is resolved into bones and
〈sinews〉 and flesh, it does not follow that they are composed of these as part of their
essence but as their matter; and these are parts of the concrete whole, but not of the form,
or that to which the formula refers. [... 1035a26] All things which are concrete
combinations of form and matter (e.g. “the snub” or the bronze circle) can be resolved
into form and matter, and the matter is a part of them. [... 1035a32] For this reason the
clay statue can be resolved into clay, and the sphere into bronze, and Callias into flesh
and bones, and the circle too into segments, because it is something which is combined
with matter. For we use the same name the absolute circle and for the particular circle,
since there is no special name for the particular circles.
[... 1935b7] But the formula of the right angle is not divisible into the formula of an
acute angle, but vice versa; since in defining the acute angle we use the right angle,
because “the acute angle is less than a right angle.” It is the same with the circle and
the semicircle; for the semicircle is defined by means of the circle. And the finger is
defined by means of the whole body; for a finger is a particular kind of part of a man.
Thus such parts as are material, and into which the whole is resolved as into matter,
are posterior to the whole [...].
Semicircles, line segments and acute angles are certainly mathematicals (and the
text points out explicitly not to speak exclusively of the sensible circles etc.). One
sense in which mathematicals can be matter is thus as components of other
mathematicals (this does not preclude that it may also be possible in other senses,
but Aristotle does not tell how). That the reflections are really concerned with
mathematicals and not with sensible shapes alone – but with individual, not universal
mathematicals – is confirmed by a later passage from the book, namely
1036b33–1037a5 [trans. Tredennick 1933: I, 367–369]:
And with respect to 〈the mathematicals〉, why are the formulae of the parts not parts of
bone from the elements in a specific ratio (see p. 3) that “clearly, numbers are neither substance
not the cause of forms; the ratio, indeed, is the substance, and the number matter”. The third
isΗ, 1045a34–36 [trans. Tredennick 1933: I, 425], “some matter is intelligible and some sensible,
and part of the formula is always matter and part actuality; e.g., the circle is a plane figure”.
The last passage clearly corresponds to the view of a genus as a substrate and a kind of quasi-
matter which, when receiving differentiae specificae functioning as quasi-form, brings forth
the more substantial species (Metaphysics ∆, 1016a24–32; Ζ, 1039a24–27), and thus speaks of
the universal circle; the ratio, in contrast, appears as a parallel to the individual man, and
must thus be seen as an individual ratio between particular numbers (which on their part
correspond to the bodily parts).
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the formulae of the whole; e.g., why are the formulae of the semicircles not parts of the
formulae for the circle? for they are not sensible. Probably this makes no difference;
because there will be matter even of some things which are not sensible. Indeed there
will be matter in some sense in everything which is not essence or form considered
independently, but a particular thing. Thus the semicircles will be parts not of the
universal circle but of the particular circles, as we said before [namely in the passage
quoted above] – for some matter is sensible, and some intelligible.
Metaphysics Μ, 1077a33–36 asks in what sense lines (referred to as the primary
generators of mathematicals) can be substances.10 Not by being “some kind of form
or shape” (ειδος και µορφη τις) like the soul, nor as matter, as the body is; indeed,
“it certainly does not appear that [anything] can be composed of lines or planes or
points”, which would be the case if lines were a kind of material substance.
Superficially read, the passage looks like a rejection of the view of mathematicals
as intelligible matter. Aristotle’s own inference, however, is that lines cannot be
“material substance” for (potentially animate, and thus sensible) bodies, as are flesh
and bone for the living being. When summarizing, he concludes (1077b12, trans.
[Tredennick 1933: I, 187])
(a) that the 〈mathematicals〉 are not more substantial than corporeal objects; (b) that they
are not prior in point of existence to sensible things, but only in formula; and (c) that
they cannot in any way exist in separation.
This is thus a rejection of Pythagorean and related derivations of sensible reality
from the mathematicals, and has no bearing on the status of mathematicals as
intelligible matter for other intelligible entities (mathematicals, or whatever else might
be imagined).
A discussion in book Β is part of the same confrontation. Already in book Α,
987b15–18 [trans. Tredennick 1933: I, 45] we find that the mathematicals not only
constitute a separate category along with forms and sensible things for Plato, but
that they stand between (µεταξυ) these, differing “from sensible things in being
eternal and immutable, and from the Forms in that there are many similar 〈of them〉,
whereas each Form is itself unique”. In book Β, 997b13–998a19 [trans. Tredennick
1933: I, 113–117] Aristotle makes it clear that he finds the notion absurd:
[...] if anyone posits Intermediates distinct from Forms and sensible things, he will have
many difficulties; because obviously not only will there be lines apart from both Ideal
[τ’ αυτας] and sensible lines, but it will be the same with each of the other classes. Thus
since astronomy is one of the mathematical sciences, there will have to be a heaven
besides the sensible heaven, and a sun and moon, and all the other heavenly bodies.
10 This follows shortly after a cross-reference to the discussion of the impossible independent
existence of mathematicals in book Β to which we shall turn imminently. The cross-referencing
between books Α, Β, Ζ and Μ ensures that it is legitimate to combine the evidence they offer.
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But how are we to believe this. Nor is it reasonable that the heaven should be immovable;
but that it should move is utterly impossible.11 It is the same with the objects of optics
and the mathematical theory of harmony; these too, cannot exist apart from sensible
objects. Because if there are intermediate objects of sense and sensations, clearly there
will also be animals intermediate between the Ideal animals and the perishable animals.
One might also raise the question with respect to what kind of objects we are to
look for these sciences. For if we are to take it that the only difference between
mensuration and geometry is that the one is concerned with things which we can perceive
and the other with things which we cannot, clearly there will be a science parallel to
medicine (and to each of the other sciences), intermediate between Ideal medicine and
the medicine which we know. Yet how is this possible? for then there would be a class
of healthy things apart from those which are sensible and from the Ideally healthy. Nor,
at the same time, is it true that mensuration is concerned with sensible and perishable
magnitudes; for then it would perish as they do. Nor, again, can astronomy be concerned
with sensible magnitudes or with this heaven of ours; for as sensible lines are not like
those of which the geometrician speaks (since there is nothing which is straight and
curved in that sense; the [sensible] circle touches the ruler not at a point but [along a
line] as Protagoras used to say in refuting the geometricians), so the paths and orbits
of our heaven are not like those which astronomy discusses, nor have the 〈points〉 [σηµεια]
of the astronomer the same nature as the stars.
Some, however, say that these so-called Intermediates between Forms and sensible
objects do exist: not indeed separately from the sensibles, but in them. It would take
too long to consider in detail all the impossible consequences of this theory, but it will
be sufficient to observe the following. On this view it is not logical that only this should
be so; clearly it would be possible for the Forms also to be in sensible things; for the
same argument applies to both. Further, it follows necessarily that two solids must occupy
the same space; and that the forms cannot be immovable, being present in sensible things,
which move. And in general, what is the object of assuming that Intermediates exist,
but only in sensible things? The same absurdities as before will result: there will be a
heaven besides the sensible one, only not apart from it, but in the same place; which
is still more impossible.
Various observations beyond the rejection of Intermediates can be made regarding
this passage. Firstly, that much of the argument is built around “the more physical
of the mathematical sciences” (τα φυσικωτερα των µαθηµατον – Physics II, 194a8):
astronomy, optics and harmonics. Since Aristotle does ascribe to these a particular
status among the mathemata, he might have discarded them as not directly relevant,
which he fails to do. Secondly, the parallel to medicine strengthens the impression
that the relation between the mathematical sciences (and thus also the mathematicals)
and the sensible world is understood to be fundamental. Thirdly, that Aristotle feels
entitled to assume that the presence of intelligible mathematicals in sensibles assumed
by some of those against whom he argues is meant spatially. Perhaps we should
11 Namely because movement belongs solely with the sensible, and thus not with a merely
intelligible intermediate heaven.
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understand this “presence in” as an identification of the intelligible sphere with the
actual surface of the bronze sphere. That such an identification is in any case not
accepted by Aristotle is clear from the endorsement of what Protagoras says about
the actual comportment of lines and circles understood as external limits of sensible
rulers and wheels. The relation between mathematicals and sensibles, though
indubitably pivotal, is no such simple connection. Nor is it a Platonic “participation”
(µεθεξις), since this is said in book Α, 987b13–14 to be nothing but a formulation in
other words of the Pythagorean view of reality as an imitation (µιµησις) of
numbers12 (deprived moreover of clear meaning), and in 991a22–23 to be “empty
talk and poetical metaphors”.
These scattered observations should allow us to approach the main investigation
of the possible existence of mathematicals as unchangeable and eternal substance,
which is undertaken in MetaphysicsΜ, chapters I–III – the chapters on which Edward
Hussey’s fairly recent discussion [1992] of Aristotle’s view of the mathematicals
concentrates. Many points made in these chapters repeat what we have already
discussed (and a few were already quoted) – thus the (cross-referenced) dismissal
of the Platonist and similar theses about the status of Forms and mathematicals as
independent substances either separate from sensibles or to be found “in” them.
Before discussing what is said we should take note of what is not said. Even
in these chapters, the mathematicals are never told to be substances;13 however
large the range of categories that on one or the other occasion are designated thus
(be it in a secondary or lesser sense, as with universals, forms and matter), this range
is not large enough to encompass numbers, ratios and circles. This is made explicit
(concerning the special case of lines) in chapter II, 1077a32–36 [trans. Tredennick 1933:
II, 185–187] – (cf. p. 8):
12 In Ν, 1090a21–24 [trans. Tredennick 1933: II, 277] we find the more familiar version of the
Pythagorean doctrine – namely that the Pythagoreans,
observing that many attributes of numbers apply to sensible bodies, assumed that real
things are numbers; not that numbers exist separately, but that real things are composed
of numbers. But why? Because the attributes of numbers are to be found in a musical
scale, in the heavens, and in many other connections.
Since the account in book Α is specific and refers to a precise terminology (“µιµησις”), we
may take it to render something which at least some Pythagoreans would sometimes say,
if not necessarily to express a generally held Pythagorean view of the nature of number and
material reality.
13 The only exception I have found is Metaphysics Μ, 1092b13, where the ratio – the least
substantial of Aristotle’s mathematicals, we might say – is said to be the ουσια and number
its matter; but this is probably too particular to allow the conclusion beyond the ensuing
refusal of substantial status for number.
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[...] body is a kind of substance, since it already in some sense possesses completeness
(τελειος); but in what sense are lines substances? Neither as being a kind of form or shape,
nor as being body, like the body; for it does not appear that anything can be composed
of either lines or of planes or of points, whereas if they were a kind of material substance
it would be apparent that things can be so composed.
The refusal to classify the mathematicals as substances even in the most diluted sense
already locates them at the same level as the accidental characteristics (παθη) of
substances proper, that is, of entities that have full and separate existence. And the
text indeed goes on as follows (1077b1–17, trans. [Tredennick 1933: II, 187]):
Let it be granted that [lines etc.] are prior in formula; yet not everything which is prior
in formula is also prior in substantiality. Things are prior in formula from whose formulae
the formulae of other things are compounded. And these characteristics are not
indissociable [ουχ αµα υπαρχει]. For if attributes, such as “moving” or “white,” do not
exist apart from their substances, “white” will be prior in formula to “white man,” but
not in substantiality; for it cannot exist in separation, but always exists conjointly with
the concrete whole [αµα τω συνολω εστιν] – by which I mean “white man.” Thus it is
obvious that neither is the result of abstraction [αφαιρεσις, “taking away”] prior, nor
the result of adding a determinant [προσθεσις14] posterior – for the expression “white
man” is the result of adding a determinant to “white”.
Thus we have sufficiently shown (a) that the 〈mathematicals〉 are not more substantial
than corporeal objects;15 (b) that they are not prior in point of existence to sensible things
but only in formula; and (c) that they cannot in any way exist in separation. And since
we have seen that they cannot exist in sensible things, it is clear that either they do not
exist at all, or they exist only in a certain way, and therefore not absolutely; for “exist”
has several senses.
This does not assert that there is no difference between mathematicals and properties
like colour, and probably it is not meant to convey that message; but if the argument
is to possess any validity it must presuppose that they belong to ontologically
comparable categories.
Chapter III gets closer to positive assertions about the mathematicals. Its
beginning reads thus (1077b18–1078a9, trans. [Tredennick 1933: II, 187–191]):
The general propositions in mathematics are not concerned with objects which exist
separately apart from magnitudes and numbers; they are concerned with magnitudes
and numbers, but not with them as possessing magnitude or being divisible.16 It is
14 Literally “putting unto”, the opposite of “taking away” – no “determinant” is spoken of
in the Greek text.
15 The whole passage is indeed directed against the Pythagorean, Platonic and related
persuasions.
16 As examples of such “general propositions” we may first of all think of Euclid’s “common
notions”; but Posterior Analytics I (74a18–25, trans. [Tredennick 1960: 51]) offers a more
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clearly possible that in the same way propositions and logical proofs may apply to
sensible magnitudes; not qua sensible, but qua 〈being such〉 [η τοιαδι]. For just as there
can be many propositions about things merely qua movable, without any reference to
the 〈suchness〉 [των τοιουτων] of each one or their 〈accidents〉 [των σuµβεβηκοτων], and
it does not necessarily follow from this either that there is something movable which
exists in separation from sensible things or that there is a distinct movable nature in
sensible things; so too there will be propositions and sciences which apply to movable
things, not qua movable but qua corporeal only; and again qua planes only and qua lines
only, and qua divisible, and qua indivisible only. Therefore since it is true to say in a
general sense not only that things which are separable but that things which are
inseparable exist, e.g., that movable things exist, it is also true to say in a general sense
that 〈the mathematicals〉 exist, and 〈indeed such as they [the mathematicians] say〉. And
just as it is true to say generally of the other sciences that they deal with a particular
subject – not with that which is accidental to it (e.g. not with “white” if “the healthy”
is white, and the subject of the science is “the healthy”), but with that which is the subject
of the particular science; with the healthy if it treats of things qua healthy, and with man
if qua man – so this is also true of geometry. If the things of which it treats are
accidentally sensible, although it does not treat of them qua sensible, it does not follow
that the mathematical sciences treat of sensible things – nor, on the other hand, that they
treat of other things which exist independently apart from these.
Many 〈accidents〉 are essential [καθ’αυτα] properties of things possessing a particular
characteristic; e.g., there are 〈affections〉 [παθη] peculiar to an animal qua female or qua
male, although there is no such thing as female or male in separation from animals.17
Hence there are also attributes which are peculiar to things merely qua lines or planes.
sophisticated instance, which is indeed taken by Heath [1949: 223] as the clearest example
of the category:
[...] the law that proportionals alternate might be supposed to apply to numbers qua
numbers, and similarly to lines, solids and periods of time; as indeed it used to be
demonstrated of these subjects separately. It could, of course, have been proved of them
all by a single demonstration, but since there were no single term to denote the common
quality of numbers, lengths, time and solids, and they differ in species from one another,
they were treated separately; but now the law is proved universally; for the property
did not belong to them qua lines or qua numbers, but qua possessing this special quality
which they are assumed to possess universally.
17 Richard Hope [1960: 275] understands this period differently:
So there are many traits that things have because they are what they are: a living being
has the attributes of being female or male, yet there is no female or male being separate
from living beings.
Read in this way (which seen in isolation seems to agree better with the Greek text), the point
would thus be analogous to the observation that bodies may have different shapes, but being
bodies they need to have some shape. However, the following period (which Hope translates
in the same vein as Tredennick, “there are peculiar attributes that things have when taken
only as lengths or as planes”) agrees better with Tredennick’s reading.
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This is remarkable not only for stating the legitimacy of an investigation which leaves
out certain characteristics as irrelevant and concentrates on those which are the
concern of the science in question as if these could occur in isolation but also for
a remarkable symmetry between types of characteristics. In the “textbook version”
of Aristotle’s ontology, genuine substances come about when form is impressed upon
matter; this provides these substances with necessary attributes. Besides these, they
may receive other attributes which, however, are accidental; this is the basis for the
distinction between explanations based on causes, answers to questions “why”, and
a mathematical description à la Archimedes or Ptolemy. In the present passage, as
we see, it is supposed to depend on the perspective of the investigation – whether
a natural object is examined by physics or geometry – which characteristics are
accidental and which not. When contemplated by a geometer, the sensibility of a
bronze sphere – its most fundamental characteristic according to the standard
ontology – becomes an “accident”.18
After a passage treating of the exactness of various types of knowledge (to which
we shall return on p. 15), Aristotle closes the reflections on the abstraction from
(literally, removal of) what is accidental according to the perspective of the science
in question with these words (1078a14–31, trans. [Tredennick 1933: II, 191–193]):
The same principle applies to both harmonics and optics, for neither of these sciences
studies objects qua sight or qua sound, but qua lines and numbers; yet the latter are
affections peculiar to the former. The same is also true of mechanics.
Thus if we regard objects independently of their 〈accidents〉 and investigate any aspect
of them as so regarded, we shall not be guilty of any error on this account, any more
than when we draw a diagram on the ground and say that a line is a foot long when
it is not; because the error is not in the premisses. The best way to conduct an
investigation in every case is to take that which does not exist in separation and consider
it separately; which is just what the arithmetician or the geometrician does. For man,
qua man, is one indivisible thing;19 and the arithmetician assumes man to be one
indivisible thing,20 and then considers whether there is any 〈accident〉 of man qua
indivisible. And the geometrician considers man neither qua man nor qua indivisible,
but qua something solid [στερεον]. For clearly 〈what〉 would have belonged to “man”
18 As a matter of fact, the same dependence on the perspective of what is accidental is asserted
in book Α, 980b20. Here it is accidental that Socrates is a man if the observation is made by
a physician. The incipient shift of the distinction between the necessary and the accidental
from ontology to epistemology is thus no mere effect of the need to rationalize the existence
of mathematics in Metaphysics Μ.
19 If divided (mentally or by a butcher’s saw), indeed, man is no longer man but a plurality
of bodily parts (either conceptually or in reality). Cf. p. 3.
20 Namely when identifying a collection of n persons with the number n. We remember the
(Pythagorean and later) definition of number as a “collection of units”.
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even if man were somehow not indivisible can belong to man irrespectively of his
humanity or indivisibility. Hence for this reason the geometricians are right in what they
maintain, and treat of 〈being things〉 [οντα]; 〈and being things〉 exist. For 〈being is twofold〉,
either complete reality or matterlike.21
A similar point of view is expressed in more detail in the same terminology in book
Ι, 1061a29ff [trans. Tredennick 1933: II, 67–69]:
[...] the mathematician makes a study of abstractions (for in his investigations he first
abstracts everything that is sensible, such as weight and lightness, hardness and its
contrary, and also heat and cold and other sensible contrarieties, leaving only quantity
an continuity – sometimes in one, sometimes in one, sometimes in two and sometimes
in three dimensions – and their affections qua quantitative and continuous, and does
not study them with respect to any other thing; and in some cases investigates the relative
positions of things and the properties of these, and in others their commensurability or
incommensurability, and in others their ratios; yet nevertheless we hold that there is
one and the same science of all these things, viz. geometry) [...].
Two passages from other works should be drawn in at this point. One is Posterior
Analytics I, 74a39–74b4 [trans. Tredennick 1960: 53]. In connection with the question
how to attain universal knowledge when we have so far only achieved knowledge
of particular cases (cf. note 16), Aristotle observes that
the property of having angles equal to the sum of two right angles will apply to “bronze
isosceles triangle”; and it will still apply when “bronze” and “isosceles” are removed
– but not if “triangle” is removed. We notice that the matter and the geometrical
property are treated in full parallel, in agreement with the “matterlike” existence
of mathematical properties and with the discussion of mathematicals as “intelligible
matter” in Metaphysics Ζ.
The other is Physics II, 193b24–36 [trans. Wicksteed & Cornford 1957: I, 119],
which is often mentioned as a parallel to the discussion of abstraction or removal
in Metaphysics Μ. Here we read that
we have next to consider how the mathematician differs from the 〈natural philosopher〉
[φυσικος]; for natural bodies have surfaces and occupy spaces, have lengths and present
points, all which are subjects of mathematical study. And then there is the connected
question whether astronomy is a separate science 〈or part of natural philosophy〉; for if
the student of nature is concerned to know what the sun and moon are, it were strange
if he could avoid 〈their accidents〉; especially as we find that the writers on nature have,
as a fact, discoursed on the shape of the moon and sun and 〈on〉 whether the earth and
the cosmos〉 is spherical or otherwise.
〈The mathematician, then, also deals with these [i.e., surfaces, spaces, lengths, points],
but not〉 qua boundaries of natural bodies, nor 〈does he consider the accidents indicated
as accidents of such substances〉. Therefore he separates them; for they are 〈separable
21 Cf. note 9.
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according to thought from motions, and it makes no difference, nor does separation lead
to any falsity〉.
As we might perhaps expect in a work dealing centrally with natural philosophy
(“physics”), attributes belonging to “nature” and regarded by mathematics are treated
on a less equal footing here than in MetaphysicsΜ – appurtenance according to nature
seems to be ontological, whereas the mathematicians’ abstraction is epistemological,
only performed “according to thought” (τη νοησει) – and it is no longer produced
by “removal” but by “separation”.22 From the absolute perspective of this work,
the properties regarded by the mathematician – in geometry, the shape – remain
“accidents”. But geometrical shapes remain properties of physical bodies, properties
that can be isolated from these by some process of abstraction, and they have no
genuinely separate existence.
We must conclude that this is the general view of Aristotle regarding the status
of the mathematicals; geometrical shape is a property of bodies, as number is a
property of collections of units; even ratio is a ratio between numbers of something
or quantities, and thus a property of a relation between such concrete collections
or quantities; this is indeed stated in Metaphysics Ν, 1092b18–23. His only vacillation
is between the asymmetrical position of the Physics (which may also be that of the
early Metaphysics Ν, though that is not sure) and the symmetrical stance of
Metaphysics Μ: (i) the Physics distinguishes between an ontologically based
suppression of the accidents of shape which may be undertaken by the natural
philosopher, and the abstraction in thought from “physical” properties undertaken
by the mathematician; (ii) Metaphysics Μ, in contrast, grounds removals neither on
an ontological distinction between natural necessity and accidents of shape or number
nor on individual thought, but on the distinctive view or approach of the investigating
science – somehow intermediate between the absolute ontological necessity and
(legitimate but still arbitrary) personal choice.
In terms of the distinction of Metaphysics Ζ, 1035b33–1036a12 (above, p. 5), this
understanding of the mathematicals as properties of substances would first of all
concern the individual circles and their kin, which would be properties of the drawn
individual circles. The circle in the sense of λογος or “what it is to be a circle” would
then be a universal, similar to the “secondary substances” of the Categories.
22 This difference of vocabulary is hardly random: a proper elimination of characteristics that
are regarded as essential might sound too strange. Instead, the Physics (which according to
cross-references is likely to be earlier than the Metaphy
sics-Μ passages) makes use of a terminology closer to the discussion of the Platonic stance.
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This seems a reassuring conclusion,23 but only until this passage from
Metaphysics Β returns to our mind (cf. fuller quotation on p. 10):
Nor, again, can astronomy be concerned with sensible magnitudes or with this heaven
of ours; for as sensible lines are not like those of which the geometrician speaks (since
there is nothing which is straight and curved in that sense; the [sensible] circle touches
the ruler not at a point but [along a line] as Protagoras used to say in refuting the
geometricians), so the paths and orbits of our heaven are not like those which astronomy
discusses, nor have the points of the astronomer the same nature as the stars.
If the circular and the straight are properties of the boundaries of physical bodies,
merely regarded in abstraction from the physical properties of these bodies, how
can that which a circle regarded mathematically has in common with a touching straight
line be a mere point and that which they have in common without mental removal
be a whole line segment?
The dilemma is not restricted to mathematics; it has a strict parallel in the
difficulty which we encounter if we interpret an Aristotelian “nature” through the
modern notion of a natural law. We may look at this passage from the Politics
(1253a2–5, trans. [Rackham 1944: 9]):
[...] therefore it is clear that the city-state is 〈by nature〉, and that man is by nature a
political animal, and a man that is citiless by nature and not merely by fortune is 〈truly
either a petty man or beyond measure〉.
An Aristotelian nature is, indeed, a final cause, that after which the entity for which
it is a cause strives, not necessarily that which it achieves. This is explained in Physics
II, (199a7–199b26, trans. [Hardie & Gaye 1930]):
[...] action for an end is present in things which come to be and are by nature.
Further, where a series has a completion, all the preceding steps are for the sake
of that. Now surely as in intelligent action, so in nature; and as in nature, so it is in each
action, if nothing interferes. Now intelligent action is for the sake of an end; therefore
the nature of things also is so. Thus if a house, e.g., had been a thing made by nature,
it would have been made in the same way as now by art; and if things made by nature
were made also by art, they would come to be in the same way as by nature. Each step
then in the series is for the sake of the next; and generally art partly completes what
nature cannot bring to a finish, and partly imitates her. If, therefore, artificial products
23 Or perhaps not fully reassuring, since it can be argued to entail that the “abstraction of
the mathematician ends up not with pure quantity but with quantified substance” [Anderson
1969: 17]. Therefore, as the sensible circle has the sensible bronze circle has its substrate, the
mathematical circle (at least the individual circle) must have unspecified physical substance
as its substrate and, in this sense, its matter. This would be a parallel to the view of a genus
as quasi-matter and the differentiae specificae quasi-form (cf. note 9), and would therefore present
us with no difficulties if only Aristotle had ever hinted at something of the kind. Unfortunately
he never does but leaves it to Thomas Aquinas to make the point – cf. [Anderson 1969a].
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are for the sake of an end, so clearly also are natural products. [...].
[...] And since ‘nature’ means two things, the matter and the form, of which the latter
is the end, and since all the rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be the cause
in the sense of ‘that for the sake of which’.
Now mistakes come to pass even in the operations of art: the grammarian makes
a mistake in writing and the doctor pours out the wrong dose. Hence clearly mistakes
are possible in the operations of nature also . If then in art there are cases in which what
is rightly produced serves a purpose, and if where mistakes occurred there was a purpose
in what was attempted, only it was not attained, so must it be also in natural products,
and monstrosities will be failures in the purposive effort. [...]
[...]
[...] For those things are natural which, by a continuous movement originated from
an internal principle, arrive at some completion: the same completion is not reached from
every principle; nor any chance completion, but always the tendency in each toward
the same end, if there is no impediment.
[...] But when an event takes place always or for the most part, it is not incidental
or by chance. In natural products the sequence is invariable, if there is no impediment.
Next follows a discussion of “necessity”, where we read the following (200a15–19):
Necessity in mathematics is in a way similar to necessity in things which come to
be through the operation of nature. Since a straight line is what it is, it is necessary that
the angles of a triangle should equal two right angles. But not conversely; though if the
angles are not equal to two right angles, then the straight line is not what it is either.
Beyond what this passage asserts directly, it tells us that it is legitimate to think
of the mathematical properties of things in parallel to those properties that constitute
their “nature”: not something which is necessarily so but as something which is so
to the extent “there is no impediment”. For further illustration, we may turn to the
passage from Metaphysics Μ which was omitted between two quotations on p. 18
(1078a9–13, trans. [Tredennick 1933: II, 191]):
And in proportion as the things which we are considering are prior in formula and
simpler, they admit of greater exactness (ακριβης); for simplicity implies exactness. Hence
we find greater exactness where there is no magnitude, and the greatest exactness where
there is no motion; or if motion is involved, where it is primary, because this is the
simplest kind; and the simplest kind of primary motion is uniform motion.
Since it has just been stated (1077b1, above, p. 12) “that [lines etc.] are prior in
formula” without being thereby “prior in substantiality”, it appears that mathematical
properties of substances may indeed surpass “in exactness” those substances of which
they are properties, just as these may be surpassed by their forms in perfection.24
24 This point, and this analogy, is probably the explanation of what Hussey [1992: 125 n.40]
regards as a “puzzling and isolated passage”, namely Posterior Analytics I, 79a6–10 [trans.
Tredennick 1960: 91]:
Of this kind [viz, studied by more than one science] are all objects which, while having
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Other sciences should study the nature of their object, not those shortcomings of
individual specimens that are produced by accidental impediments that cripple this
nature; in the same way, mathematics should deal with the mathematicals in their
precision (on which condition they are only intelligible), not impeded by the
shortcomings of the sensible substances of which they are properties.25
We may see this as an implied acceptance of the separate existence of ideal
mathematicals; but we must recognize that this was not how Aristotle saw things,
nor apparently the readers of his epoch.
Euclid’s postulates: counterfactual existence claims?
The preceding scrutiny of Aristotle has shed some indirect light on the
Pythagorean and Platonic views of the nature of the mathematicals. We might go
further in this direction and look at later writings belonging to the Platonic and neo-
Pythagorean currents – beginning with Nicomachos, according to whose Introduction
(I.VI, trans. [Bertier 1978: 59f]) that number which orders everything by nature in
the cosmos is able to do so because it is founded upon “le nombre préexistant dans
la penseée du dieu créateur”, and going on with other writers at various levels. One
reason for not proceeding in this direction (apart from limitations of time and space)
is that this esoterical number and its associates have little to do with the
mathematicals that were treated in mathematics; as Aristotle observes in Metaphysics
Ν, 1090b27-35 [trans. Tredennick 1933: II, 281] about the particular “ideal numbers”,
“no mathematical theorem applies to them, unless one tries to interfere with the
principles of mathematics and invent particular theories of one’s own”; further, those
who invented “two kinds of number, the Ideal and the mathematical as well, neither
have explained nor can explain in any way how mathematical number will exist
and of what it will be composed”.
If we are interested in understanding ancient mathematics, it may therefore be
more illuminating to confront the results of the preceding with the Elements – that
a separate substantial existence, yet exhibit certain specific forms. For the mathematical
sciences are concerned with forms; they do not confine their demonstrations to a
particular substrate. Even if geometrical problems 〈treat of〉 a particular substrate, at least
they do 〈not do so qua treating of a substrate〉.
Obviously, since the pertinence of “more than one science” is a consequence of the possession
of the “specific forms” referred to, these “forms” cannot be the nature that give the objects
in question their “substantial existence”; they (and thus the “forms” with which the
mathematical sciences are concerned) must be something which shares fundamental
characteristics of forms without being forms in the ontological sense. The passage should
probably rather be read in the light of Metaphysics Μ than in continuation of Physics II.
25 We notice that this eliminates Anderson’s dilemma as described in note 23.
17
ancient mathematical treatise which comes closest to the model for scientific work
delineated in the Posterior Analytics. The point on which we shall focus is the set
of postulates, things which are required (ed. [Heiberg 1883: I, 8], trans. [Heath 1926:
154]):
[1] 〈It is requested〉 to draw a straight line from any point to any point,
[2] 〈and〉 to produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight line,
[3] 〈and〉 to describe a circle with any centre and distance,
[4] 〈and〉 that all right angles are equal to one another,
[5] 〈and〉 that, if a straight line falling on two straight lines make the interior angles on
the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced
indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the angles less than the two right angles.
There is no doubt that definitions were familiar in mathematics already in Plato’s
and Aristotle’s times; at least one of Euclid’s common notions is also quoted by
Aristotle as an example of the category of axioms. It is much less certain how far
back the postulates should be dated, and how they relate to Aristotle’s notions of
hypotheses and postulates.26 I shall therefore leave the question of chronology and
inventor aside and just argue from the postulates as they are found in the text.27
A feature which as far as
Postulates 2–3 and 5 related to a finite cosmos.
I have noticed has never been
emphasized is that postulates
2–3 and 5 are counterfactual
according to ancient standard
cosmologies – including
26 See the convenient summary in [McKirahan 1992: 133–137]. To this may be added, however,
that the first postulate seems to have been known to Aristotle in a formulation close to what
we find in the Elements – Physics III, 207b29–31 [trans. Hardie & Gaye 1930] explains that
mathematicians “do not need the infinite and do not use it. They postulate only that the finite
straight line may be produced as far as they wish”.
27 More precisely, in the Heiberg text and in most of the manuscripts. Some medieval
manuscript traditions include a supplementary postulate, namely that two lines cannot include
a space – thus “Adelard I”, ed. [Busard 1983: 32]). Others make this a common notion – thus
the translation due to Gerard of Cremona [ed. Busard 1984: 3]. The former variant is referred
to by Simplicios in his commentary as quoted by al-Nayrı¯zı¯ [ed., trans. Heiberg 1893: 25],
who adds that it is not found in old manuscripts; the latter was known to Proclos (In primum
Euclidis Elementorum librum commentarii 19621–23, trans. [Morrow 1970: 154]), who points out
that this is no notion common to more mathematical sciences but exclusively geometric.
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Aristotle’s.28 If the cosmos is a sphere with a finite radius, it will still be possible
to connect any two points with a straight line, since all points will have to fall within
the sphere. But a line going from one pole of the firmament to the other cannot be
produced; if we chose a point with a small distance δ from the firmament as our
centre and 2R–2δ as radius (R being the radius of the firmament and cosmos), then
our attempted circle will be a short arc and no “figure” (something enclosed by a
boundary or boundaries – def. 14) – or, if we take the firmament as part of the
boundary, then two circles of the kind will not meet, and the demonstration of prop.
1 fails. Even the fifth postulate becomes untenable – actually, what we get
(presupposing the adequate metric) is one of Felix Klein’s models for non-Euclidean
geometry.
This can be understood in one of three ways. We may assume that Euclid the
mathematician rejected the prevalent cosmology of the philosophers, or followed
a philosophy which held the cosmos to be without limit; we may look at the list
of postulates as part of a Wittgensteinian language game; and we may try to make
sense of it within the Platonic or Aristotelian framework.
Since we know nothing of Euclid as a person, the first possibility cannot be totally
excluded; but this would at most explain why he wrote as he did, not why his work
was so widely accepted and called forth no objections from later commentators on
this account – neither from Ptolemy, who according to Proclos was critical of taking
the fifth postulate as a postulate, nor from Proclos the Platonist himself, nor from
Simplicios the Aristotelian. We may add that the most renowned infinite cosmology –
that of Epicuros – was coupled to an understanding of geometry that was probably
much too naive to appeal to anybody versed in mathematics.
Remain the Wittgensteinian (or, better perhaps, “naive-Wittgensteinian”)
interpretation, and the correlation with Aristotelian and Platonic views.
An appeal to the notion of a language game is less out of the way than it might
seem at first. It is an old observation that several of Euclid’s definitions define little.To
explain a point as “that which has no part” might identify it, for instance, with
Parmenides’s, Speusippos’s or Plotinus’s One or with Allah (as was indeed done
28 Simplicios [ed., Latin trans. Besthorn & Heiberg 1898: I, 15] comes so close that he would
certainly have mentioned the cosmological problem if it had been familiar or had come to
his own well-trained Aristotelian mind. In his commentary to the principles of the Elements
he refers both to the common-sense protest that one cannot continue a line over the sea
(apparently thinking on drawings made on the Rhodian or some other shore) and the
philosophical objection that “the infinite does not exist”, ascribing both to what is “commonly
held” (the philosophical objection is of course somewhat off the point, since the postulate
does not ask for this actual but only for the potential infinite – cf. also the quotation from
Physics III quoted in note 26).
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by medieval Islamic theologians). But if we already know that we are practising
geometry, it becomes meaningful to explain that a dot (be it στιγµη, “a mark”, be
it σηµειον, “a sign”) is henceforth a dot so small that it has no parts, and that a stroke
(γραµµη) is henceforth presupposed to be a length so narrow that it has no breadth
at all; as Aristotle points out (Topics VI, 143b28–29), this definition presupposes that
there are lengths without as well as lengths provided with a width.
We may look at the postulates in the same light, and say that they provide the
foundation that is indispensable if we want to play the game of geometry (that is,
play it in agreement with the intuitions that are either more or less inborn or
produced by a century’s professional practising of the discipline).29 Since it is
doubtful whether Aristotle knew these postulates, they seem indeed to have been
introduced as things which one has to require if the game is to be played.
In the case of the fifth postulate, it is rather obvious from the sources that this
is what had happened. In Prior Analytics II, 64b34–65a9 [trans. Tredennick 1938:
485–487], Aristotle discusses circular reasoning in deductive systems – proving Α
from Β, and Β from Γ, even though Γ is itself only accepted because it is a
consequence of Α. As an example he refers to
those persons who [...] think that they are drawing parallel lines; for they do not realize
that they are making assumptions which cannot be proved unless the parallel lines exist.
The use of the present tense “do” (ποιουσιν) shows that this was still a flaw of
geometry as practised at least by some of Aristotle’s contemporaries. Aristotle also
tells the way out: to take as an axiom (αξιοω) that which is proposed; but since he
does not tell that this is done in geometry, nor a fortiori how the axiom or postulate
should run, we may be fairly sure that no such decision had gained general
acceptance.
A similar process seems to lie behind postulate 4. The so-called “geometric
algebra” of Elements II.1-10 appears to be a “critical” re-elaboration of a set of
geometrical riddles that had circulated among Near-Eastern surveyors since c. 2000
BCE, and was solved by them by a “naive” cut-and-paste geometry, in which the
correctness of procedures could be “seen” immediately.30 Here, as in pre-Greek
surveying in general, the concept of a quantified angle did not exist; obviously,
Babylonian as well as Egyptian surveyors distinguished practically right-angled from
29 In Cicero’s words (Academica II.116, trans. [Rackham 1933: 617]), they are “first principles
of mathematics which must be granted before [the geometricians] are able to advance an inch”.
Simplicios answers similarly to the “commonly held” objections (see note 28).
30 The best known reflection of this “surveyors’ proto-algebra” is the Old Babylonian school
algebra, whose geometric character is argued in [Høyrup 1990]. The relation to the geometry
of Elements II is examined in [Høyrup 1998].
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acute and obtuse corners, but all evidence at hand suggests that their understanding
of the matter can be summed up in a pun: for them, a “right angle” was the opposite
of a “wrong angle”, that is, an angle whose legs did not determine an area.
Elements II.1–10 is a theoretical “critique” of the procedures and solutions in the
sense that they put them on a secure foundation, proving the equality of areas instead
of “moving them around”. In order to do this, the author or authors of these proofs
(probably working in the outgoing fifth century BCE) had to clarify their notion of
angles. According to the Republic (510C), the concepts of the right, the obtuse and
the acute angle were at first taken as self-evident and above discussion (and perhaps
in no need of definition); but in Metaphysics Ζ, 1035b8–9 and Μ, 1084b7 we see that
Aristotle already knew something like the definitions given in the Elements (quoting
in the former passage the definition of the acute from the right angle in words that
are almost the same as Euclid’s, see above, p. 8). That the equality of all right angles
does not follow from the definition is likely to be a secondary discovery, certainly
not yet known to Plato and probably not to Aristotle; but at some point between
Plato and Euclid the fallacy has been noticed and induced somebody to require
explicitly that all right angles be equal, since the game could not be played otherwise.
A “Wittgensteinian” interpretation thus makes sense, and does not require that
we ascribe to Euclid and his contemporaries any familiarity with the Philosophical
Investigations. All that is asked for is that intellectual autonomy of a particular
profession or scientific practice of which Aristotle’s view of separate sciences with
each its own principles is one rationalization, and the language-game formulation
another. The discrepancy between what Euclid really does and what is prescribed
by Aristotle is sufficiently large to warrant a rather a-philosophical interpretation
of the Euclidean text – Euclid, in other words, may have regarded the conflict
between the postulates and cosmology as a problem for cosmologists alone. In terms
of “existence”, such a view would be compatible with a view close to what is
regarded today as “naive Platonism” in didactical discussion – of course the objects
of mathematics exist (if somebody should get the quaint idea to ask), and of course
they are ideal and not to be identified with the diagrams we draw and the collections
of material objects which we amass.
Though compatible with the “Wittgensteinian” explanation of the use of
apparently counterfactual postulates, however, this a-philosophical stance does not
follow from it. No less compatible is the Aristotelian view as interpreted above, in
particular in the symmetrical version of Metaphysics Μ. In such a view, the
cosmological constraints might be seen as “impediments” which would interfere
with the full unfolding of the essence of lines (“what it means to be a line”), circles,
etc. The counterfactuality of the postulates would only concern the material objects
of which the mathematicals are properties, and lines and circles might therefore
21

with Physics II that what goes on is a mental separation, there is no hint in Aristotle’s
formulations that this separation could have made in a way that resulted in a
different mathematics, once we have chosen to concentrate on mathematical properties
and to disregard the rest.31
It is certainly possible to project part of the “doctrine of odd and even” of
Elements IX.21–34 onto an arithmetic modulo 2. But there is, firstly, not a single word
in the sources to suggest that the ancients saw this sequence of theorems as “an
(alternative) arithmetic” and not simply as a part of arithmetic; secondly, some of
the theorems in question are pointless if not meaningless if understood through this
projection.32 To see this as an “arithmetic constructed by the Pythagoreans”, as done
by Imre Toth [1998: 166f], is thus misleading if meant as an interpretation of ancient
thought.33
Those who doubted that mathematics as known was compulsory seem to have
rejected theoretical mathematics wholesale, not just this mathematics. In the above
quotations from Aristotle, we have already encountered two instances (both directed
against geometry): Protagoras’s appeal to the sensible line and circle, and the censure
of geometers who claim that a line drawn on the ground is one foot long even if
it is not.34 In Cicero’s Academica (a convenient compendium of post-Platonic scepticist
31 More precisely, since mathematical sciences are plural: once we have chosen the perspective
of arithmetic, only one arithmetic can result; and if we apply that of geometry, the geometry
that results is equally predetermined. Cf. MetaphysicsΜ as quoted on p. 15 (1078a24–26, trans.
[Tredennick 1933: II, 193]),
the arithmetician assumes man to be one indivisible thing, and then considers whether
there is any accident of man qua indivisible. And the geometrician considers man neither
qua man nor qua indivisible, but qua something solid.
32 Thus proposition 30 [trans. Heath 1926: II, 417], “If an odd number measure an even number,
it will also measure the half of it” – which translates into “if 1 measure 0 [which it always
does], it will also measure half of it [which can be 1 as well as 0]). Even more absurd, of
course, is the imposition of a concept of “0(mod. 2)” onto a thinking which does not know
“0”.
33 Toth’s statement is made in connection with a broad argument meant to demonstrate that
Plato and Aristotle were aware of the possibility to construct a consistent non-Euclidean
geometry (which, as he sees it, they rejected on other grounds, thus assimilating their position
to that of Saccheri and not that of Bolyai and Lobachevsky). Unfortunately for the thesis (set
forth by Toth in a number of publications since 1966), the textual evidence on which it is
based turns out on close scrutiny to be either misquoted or, at best, interpreted freely and
out of context – see [Høyrup 2000] (reproduced below as appendix).
34 Since the point is made both in Metaphysics Μ, 1078a19–20 and in Metaphysics Ν, 1089a23–26
(probably written at a considerably earlier moment), it seems likely that somebody had
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opinions) we find that Epicurus held all geometry to be false and the sun to be no
larger than it looks (II.106 and II.82, respectively); Cicero himself (arguing as a
spokesman of the scepticism of the post-Platonic Old Academy) accepts the
compelling force of geometrical reasoning.
All in all the ancients were thus convinced that mathematics, to the extent it
was at all accepted as a separate field of theoretical study, was one and compelling
(apart from its split into distinct disciplines). If this absence of free constructibility
is what we really mean by asking for existence, mathematics was certainly held to
exist.
formulated this objection in earnest.
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Appendix: Review of
Imre Toth, Aristotele e i fondamenti assiomatici della geometria. Prolegomeni alla
comprensione dei frammenti non-euclidei nel «Corpus Aristotelicum» nel loro contesto
matematico e filosofico. (Temi metafisici e problemi del pensiero antico. Studi e
testi, 56). Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 21998.
Forthcoming in Zentralblatt für Mathematik und ihre Grenzgebiete.
From 1966 onward, Imre Toth argued in a number of publications that the
mathematicians at Plato’s Academy tried to prove, first directly and next indirectly,
an equivalent to Euclid’s fifth postulate (namely Elements I.29, cf. below). In this way,
as he saw it, a counterpart of Saccheri’s quasi-non-Euclidean geometry was created –
a coherent deductive chain of propositions based on the remaining postulates and
axioms and on the negation of the (equivalent of the) fifth postulate. He mainly
argued from a set of passages in the Aristotelian corpus, which in his reading showed
that a whole body of theorems belonging to such a chain was known.
This not fully unprecedented but still revolutionary thesis was mostly received
with taciturn reservation, for which reason Toth is now publishing a book size
discussion of the Aristotelian passages (which may have appeared, but which the
reviewer has not seen); the volume under review is a kind of broad prolegomenon
and philosophical commentary to the matter. The book falls in two parts, the first
of which is meant as a survey of the origin of the search for axiomatics at the
Academy (referring mostly to Platonic and Aristotelian texts and organized around
the non-Euclidean problem); the second part is a protracted essay located in the
boundary region between the philosophy of mathematics (centred on Euclidean,
non-Euclidean and absolute geometry) and non-chronological history.
Unfortunately, the book is unconvincing when submitted to a close reading and
checked against the sources. This follows in part from the essay style, where
misquotations, reformulations and oblique allusions to the sources outweigh precise
references, in part from what the reviewer cannot help seeing as distorted
interpretations. Many of the philosophical reflections and observations are
stimulating; however, the philosophical stance, in as far as it can be safely extricated
from the poetical apparel, seems inconsistent. For reasons of space, a few illustrations
of these objections will have to suffice (all quotations from the book and from Greek
sources are translated into English by the reviewer).
1. On p. 585 (and already, slightly less sharply, on p. 564), it is stated that Aristotle
gives absolute priority to the object which is known over the knowledge about the
object. The actual claim of the passage referred to (Categories 7b23–27) is that the object
will generally have ontological priority, and that our knowledge will come into being
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together with its object “in few or no cases”.
2. Elements I.29 is referred to repeatedly, often obliquely; however, the first time its
content is explained (p. 100) it misquoted as “if two straight lines are parallel, then
they are co-orthogonal”. Actually, the proposition deals with the angles that are
produced if a pair of parallels is cut by a third line; co-orthogonality follows without
difficulty, but is not mentioned at all by Euclid. As a result, the discussion of a
purported fallacy in the proof (rejection of the elliptic geometry but not of the
hyperbolic possibility) on pp. 465ff is wholly off the point – all Euclid does when
two symmetrically located and thus equivalent angles are supposed to be unequal
is to assume that a specified one of the two is taken to be larger.
3. The supposedly most striking proof that Aristotle knew about (quasi-)non-
Euclidean geometry is a passage from the Eudemian Ethics (1222b15–37, repeated in
the post-Aristotelian epitome Magna moralia 1187a36–b3). It is asserted (in these words
on p. 584, but equivalently elsewhere) that “in order to illustrate the concept of
preferential choice, Aristotle does not cite an example drawn from the domain of
ethical or political praxis. Unexpectedly, even surprisingly: the only example comes
from the domain of geometry. And it is the alternative between a Euclidean and a
non-Euclidean triangle”. What actually goes on is very different: Aristotle wants to
illustrate in a simple way (referring for deeper explanation to the Analytics) the
relation between basic principles (archai) and their consequences. The example is
that the sum of the angles in a quadrangle (4 right angles) is a consequence of the
sum of the angles of the triangle; if the latter were to change (metaballo¯ – thus not
“if it were different”), for instance into three right angles, then even the former would
change (viz into 6 right angles).
This geometric observation is in need of no axiomatic network; it follows from
the drawing of a diagonal in the quadrangle. Aristotle does not explain this, but
obviously expects the derivation to be something simple which his audience (not
familiar with the technicalities of the Analytics) understands. Moreover, is it explained
that if the sum π of the angles of the triangle did not follow from other reasons
(which it is thus supposed to do), then this would have the role of a first principle.
4. On p. 526 it is stated that Metaphysics 1052a4–7 asserts that “Euclidicity and non-
Euclidicity are invariant properties, immutable, of each its own universe, since it
cannot happen that one triangle be Euclidean and another non-Euclidean or – to
speak in terms of time, which anyhow brings the same result – that a triangle may
sometimes be Euclidean and sometimes non-Euclidean”. What Aristotle actually says
is simply that “if we assume that the triangle does not change, then we shall not
assume that at some times it possesses two right angles and at some times not (for
this would mean that it changed)”.
Many other examples are of the same kind. Several chapters are spun over the
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assumption that Plato’s Cratylus deals with the question whether the internal
coherence of non-Euclidean geometry suffices for making it true (supposed to be
what Cratylus really means when claiming that the sounds or letters of words
determine their meaning), or mathematical truth has to be guaranteed in a different
way (assumed to be what Socrates means to demonstrate when destroying Cratylus’s
phono-semantics by counterexamples).
One passage remains which to a first reading might seem to lend some support
to the thesis, namely On the Heavens 281b2–7, which is taken on p. 109 to “assert the
existence of squares with commensurate diagonal” (similarly passim), and on p. 539
to present the impossibility “of a triangle to have the sum of the angles equal to
2R” as an example of a merely “hypothetical impossibility”. But even though this
agrees with current translations, the non-Euclidean implications are dubious. The
passage distinguishes things that are false haploos, “taken in isolation”, from those
which are false “from a foundation” (ex hypotheseo¯s); the most plausible reading of
the passage is thus simply that the incommensurability of the diagonal and the sum
of the angles of the triangle are not independent or primary facts but consequences
of prior principles (cf. what was said above on Eudemian Ethics 1222b15–37).
It remains that Prior Analytics 65a4–9 criticizes “those who suppose they draw
parallels” using the sum of the angles of the triangle, which sum on its part is only
established on the assumption that parallels can be drawn; and that Plato (Republic
533C) values mathematics less than dialectic in the education of the guardians because
the reasoner in mathematics does not understand the starting point or arche¯, while
dialectic is supposed to get beyond this kind of unproved first principle or
“hypothesis”; but control of Toth’s impressive body of textual hints and references
left the reviewer unconvinced that this indubitable awareness of the conditions of
axiomatic thinking (which Toth is not the first to recognize) led to the creation of
any kind of quasi-non-Euclidean geometry.
As to the apparent philosophical inconsistencies (which may however be mere
consequences of polemically intended eclecticism), one example shall suffice. Mostly,
“Euclidean and non-Euclidean knowledge” are supposed to possess no truth value
within the absolute geometry encompassing both, to “describe no preexisting object”,
and to constitute only “linguistic objects” once articulated (in these words p. 564);
but a passage blaming Aristotle for not understanding that auxiliary lines that can
be added to a diagram in a proof are present in the diagram actually, not only
potentially (p. 520) asserts that all auxiliary lines and (in less clearcut words) all
geometric figures are timelessly present in “actual being”; since the auxiliary line
in question cannot be constructed in an elliptic geometry, this claim of absolute
existence must concern the three geometries separately. (Most likely, a precise
formulation of the vague statement would entail paradoxes similar to those familiar
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from set theory).
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